NOV
DATE: 7
MEMORANDUM PORi Special Assistant to toeof Discontent"
to Allan tulles fron C. u. Jackson
datedbove subject
la ave discussed the abore reference with John Broee, Chief of RE and we agreed that in view of th* very short period of time permitted for comment, tha following points should be suggested to Mr. Dulles for purposes of the OCS mooting.
promises set forth by Mr. Jackson ln paragraphs 1of the reference do not entirely coincide with ourtbe present intelligence on tho areas in question. Weunder any cdroumetancee, thaae premises should bewith the appropriate people on Bobtaff,
however that soar form of active discontentin the satellites in question, we would feel itfor each of tha questions raised lnndth* reference to be considered by the State Departawnt. our feeling that the Russians have made it pretty olaarto keep control of Poland, Czechoslovakia andand it la further our feeling that regardloae ofof an/ Imagined uprising, the Rusaiane have ample powertheir control unless substantial military assistanceby one or mora of tbe free world powers, bine* itunderstanding that no euab outalda aid is contemplatedpolicy. It would seem contrary to our beat interestsaa those of the satellites to undertake any actionbe eonatruad aa sponsoring active opposition to thaany part of the Soviet Bloc. Via would thereforeexaaple that RiAS would not undertake any relaying ofoall or ln any wayedium for urgingallurging riots. On the other bund RIAS might wall, as It
did during the Juneiota, broadcast now* flaetejf at tvents which hud already occurred.
o. With regard to renewal of food offer* we feel that there are so nan? conalderationa such aa the accuracy of tha pre eases Mentioned above, tha availability of food, tha method whereby such offer* ar* made. now would thoy bo sad*nd aa distinguished froa an adjoining territory like Easthat it iaon short notice, to do any nor* than recommend further analysis o' available intelligence and other related problems.
d* With re ope at to an offer of asylum to border guards, it la our understanding that it is the United states position that asylum will be offered to anyone who defects for political reasons, consequently tha only issue in thia respect would seen to b* to what extent rwpetitions of the sa/lua offer would b* made public in order to persuade possible defections plan helpful action prior to defection, jn this point we feel that it would certainlyful to make known again the possibility of asylumituation of active luireat develops*
respect to diplomatic uxploltatioa In case of(tea bean our feeling for some time that appropriatethin kind would ba moat (atlpful. Thia however ia so strictlyDepartment issue that we feel that we can only statethat State should uxamine the possibilitiesiewanything which it oan Justify.
regard toecline with the Far Eaot.only aay thatould like to have the factualchecked and state that it has boon the regularsuch assets as we nave (which aa you know areon the Mainland) to use any and all subjeete whicha basis 'or separating the Chineaa coamunxats from the JdSH.
r.. Una additional pointould like to add on ay own -namely that the questions raised by nr. Jackson seam to ma to depend fundamentally on the answer to what the United Statea ia trying to accomplish both in the iraaediate future and in tha longer range future In relation to tho euro pa an satellites. Thia problem has been raised by nr.umber of times and haa been raised by various individuals inasher of times. It has bean our feeling for aoma time that unleM* wa are prepared to support,In some substantial way, active oppoaition to the ;ovist byplas of the satellites, we should be extremely cautious about olther fostering such opposition or giving it too much oncour.t ithout aid in case it should break out spontaneously. The reason for this is obvious, namely that absent really useful help, the other support oan only buynry short term good will which will. In all li kali hood, backfire into resentment In case punishment is neted out and no real fraedoa obtained. Thia
Oaiya^aUem.
hi*.
caution seems to us particularly important to consider at the foment since the Russian intention to remain in the areas in question, particularly East Oeraany, appears to be far Timor at thia time than won the case on Consequently it may not be unreasonable to assume that more severer aeasurea will bo used to quell opposition should it occur at present than was the case on
C. lliACY BAiMES CrT
Original document.
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